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Columbia University
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SYLLABUS

of a Course on

The Philosophy of Education

Education 102 — Philosophy

BY

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JUN 18 1906
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THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

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SYLLABUS OF A COURSE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

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The rough notes and suggestions furnished in this syllabus are but words along the way. They merely attempt to indicate a point of view for the consideration of the general problem of education conceived in a philosophical spirit and yet in accordance with scientific method. It is hoped that they may afford the student some aid in two directions: (*a*) in enabling him to follow the general progress of the course in the Philosophy of Education, and (*b*) by a little classification to systematize his knowledge to a degree. What is offered in this outline may smooth the ground somewhat: anything further would be valueless unless it were worked out with a completeness altogether beyond the scope of a syllabus. Its purpose is to guide and here and there offer rough notes of criticism or interpretation. It is recognized that in several sections indulgence in generalization has destroyed thoroughness in detail. A syllabus, at best, is only provisional. The outlines and references may prove suggestive in some directions: they are not intended to be exhaustive in any direction whatever. The effort to be immediately practical is postponed in favor of a study of what education has meant in the past and its significance in the intellectual and spiritual life of the present — in other words, in favor of a study of the *idea* of the educational process in its organic wholeness. The method of the syllabus is admittedly somewhat tentative. As such, it is regarded merely as a working hypothesis — a plan of action — to be justified by results, and is subject to both criticism and revision.

I. THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

¶ I. THE PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY

1. Meaning of 'philosophical theory' — Human experience as the material of philosophy.

2. Philosophy, as a reflective study of experience, aims:

(a) to give a comprehensive view of reality as revealed in experience. This element of universality, of unity and synthesis, is perhaps the fundamental characteristic of philosophy.

(b) to furnish a systematic interpretation of the presuppositions of human experience. The sciences assume the possibility of real knowledge: philosophy, as theory of knowledge, takes upon itself to inquire into the truth of such an assumption.

(c) to become an art of life, based upon scientific principles.

¶ II. THE RELATION OF THE SCIENCES TO PHILOSOPHY

1. Historical relations — Compared as to subject-matter and method — Philosophy not a mere aggregate of the sciences: rather the organism of which the various sciences are the organs — Philosophy does not aim so much to bring to light new facts as to reveal the value and the significant connections of the facts brought to light by the various sciences.

2. The science of education, for example, deals with the main features of the area which the subject-matter comprises: the philosophy deals with its boundaries, or its place in the territories of knowledge. The science of education, in other words, has to do with the theory of education as isolated by itself: the philosophy, while presupposing the science, is the theory of the relations of education to other sciences and to the known world in general.

¶ III. THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

1. Three divisions of philosophy: philosophy of nature; philosophy of the mind; philosophy of the Absolute — The philosophy of education as part of the philosophy of mind.

2. The philosophy of education aims:

(a) to trace the significance of education in its main out-

lines as a conscious, historical effort towards human evolution: in other words, to trace the relations of education to the other activities of civilization.

(b) to determine the meaning and purpose of the educational process in its functional relation to the wider intellectual and social process of the present and to the general process of life and reality. This involves an inquiry into the essential nature of the logical presuppositions which make the process possible.

3. The foundations of the philosophy of education are found in:

(a) the philosophy of mind, as it is revealed in the history of civilization and in society as at present constituted.

(b) the doctrine of evolution, by means of which the theory of education may be given a distinct relationship to the facts of the wider organic and social process.

(c) the doctrine of idealism, as affording a standard of interpretation by means of which the ethical and educational significance of the processes and influences of the civilization of the past and the present may be estimated.

REFERENCES:

Of Introductions to philosophy any one of the following would furnish the preparation necessary to a course such as is outlined in the present syllabus: Mackenzie, *Outlines of Metaphysics*; Marvin, *Introduction to Philosophy*; Paulsen, *Introduction to Philosophy*; Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*; Watson, *An Outline of Philosophy*. The more important sources of material for the philosophy of education will be indicated in connection with the respective chapters. The various lists make no pretension to completeness. A few of the works which would naturally form the nucleus of source-material are the following: Alexander, *Moral Order and Progress*; Aristotle, *Ethics*, and *Politics*; Baldwin, *Mental Development*, I-II, also, *Development and Evolution*; Bosanquet, *The Psychology of the Moral Self*, also, *The Philosophical Theory of the State*; Bryant, *Educational Ends*; Butler, *Meaning of Education*; Caird, *The Social Philosophy of Comte*; Davidson, *A History of Education*; Dewey, *School and Society*; Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*; Harris, *Psychologic Foundations of Education*; Hobhouse, *The Theory of Knowledge*, also, *Mind in Evolution*; Höffding, *History of Modern Philosophy*; Horne, *The Philosophy of Education*; Mackenzie, *Introduction to Social Philosophy*; Münsterberg, *Psychology and Life*; Nettleship, *Lectures on Plato's Republic*; O'Shea, *Education as Adjustment*; Paulsen, *A System of Ethics*; Plato, *Republic*;

Rosenkranz, *Philosophy of Education*; Royce, *The World and the Individual*; Spencer, *Sociology*; Stout, *Analytic Psychology*; Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*; Windelband, *A History of Philosophy*; Wundt, *Ethics*, I-III.

FURTHER PROBLEMS FOR STUDY:

1. The need of a philosophical basis for educational theory.
2. The historical relations of philosophy and the sciences.
3. Educational theory as influenced by special sciences.
4. The philosophy of education as a criticism of educational categories.
5. Problems of philosophy or education in their relation to the social consciousness of a period.

II. THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASES OF EDUCATION— EVOLUTION AND IDEALISM

¶ IV. EVOLUTION AS A WORKING HYPOTHESIS

1. The idea of evolution is the largest generalization yet made in scientific views of the world and is the dominating idea in the intellectual life of the present. Educational theory has so far remained almost unaffected by the evolutionary method of study, and this for two reasons: (a) the naturally conservative character of education, and (b) the influence of inherited educational doctrine. At the present time, however, a reconstruction of the theory of education in the light of the evolutionary method is coming to be recognized as both inevitable and desirable.

2. As a working hypothesis evolution maintains (a) that the changes going on throughout the universe are not chaotic or unrelated but follow an intelligible course from one state of things toward another, and (b) more particularly that the course which they follow is one of differentiation and integration. The two most impressive inductions (from another point of view they are its presuppositions) from the evolutionary method of study are, first, the continuity of existence, the *organic oneness* of all things in spite of the great contrasts in the spheres of mechanism, chemism, organism and spirit; second, that existence, so far as we know it in nature and mind, is dynamic, in a continual process of becoming. In the syllabus, then, evolution is accepted as a working hypothesis. It is presupposed that the natural and

social orders are parts of one organic process, and, in some way or other, form one cosmos. Man's living nature, therefore, is related to the nature of all life. In thus making man in his entire nature subject to evolutionary law an advantage is presented to the cause of education. Man is viewed as the outcome of the creative process of the world, and education becomes the last and highest form of evolution.

3. The basis of the educational process in organic and social evolution. Is there anything in the process of education as a fact of our experience by means of which educational theory may be brought into definite relationship with the facts of organic and social evolution?

(a) In man as compared with the lower animals there is found (i) a more completely organized nervous system, (ii) a more complex psychical life, (iii) a corresponding lengthening of the period of infancy. An adequate interpretation of the meaning of infancy was not forthcoming prior to the rise of the doctrine of evolution as a scientific method.

(b) The presuppositions of the life process in organic and social evolution are *organism* and *environment*. In both spheres the life-process is a process of adapting the organism to its environment.

(c) Education, in its widest sense, is a process of adaptation, made possible and necessary because of the period of infancy in the individual, and in this way has formed an integral part of organic and social evolution. The lengthening of the period of infancy renders education at once possible and imperative.

¶ V. IDEALISM AS A PRINCIPLE OF INTERPRETATION IN NATURE AND HISTORY

1. Judgments of fact and judgments of worth as integral elements in the process of intelligence — The danger arising from confusion of standards at the present time — According to the view advanced in the preceding section the law of evolution is recognized as a universal method of nature, of which man in his entire being is the highest and final product. It is important to recognize, however, that evolution, strictly interpreted, merely asserts that the universal state of all things is one of change or *becoming*, and that this change takes place in accordance with

rational law. In other words, it is a law or method according to which a particular reality manifests itself: it does not attempt to furnish information concerning the ultimate nature of that reality. For evolution the question is one of fact primarily, not one of worth. Educational theory, however, being normative in its character, implies an estimation of reality. Is it possible to establish any relation between 'development' and 'essential nature'? Evolution is the process of the world's 'becoming.' Does the acceptance of evolution, or the process-view, as a principle of explanation leave us with the mere change of Heraclitus, or are there any fixed limits within which the Becoming moves? (Compare the problems to which the opposition between the process-view of Heraclitus and the permanence-view of Parmenides gave rise.) Are the 'facts' of evolution merely provisional? Idealism maintains that 'evolution' is a process to be explained, not itself an explanation.

2. The theory of evolution is an assertion of the unity of life. For it a thing out of relation is not a thing at all. Every existing thing is determined to be what it is by its relation to other things. Any existing thing is a stage in a *process of relating*. To know one thing completely would imply a knowledge of the entire world of possible experience. This position idealism accepts; but, in addition, it maintains that existence (as a system of things in relations) means *existence for some consciousness*. Reality as a continual process exists for a conscious subject. To speak of a real object, or matter, existing apart from all or any consciousness involves us at once in self-contradiction. This is the first fixed term or limit which idealism sets to evolution.

3. Idealism, further, attempting to take into account all the facts of consciousness (among which unquestionably are judgments of worth, as well as judgments of fact), maintains that the true nature of any process is to be found only in the *final form which it assumes*. In their interpretation of this conception lies the importance of the contribution of Aristotle and Hegel to the philosophy of evolution. Evolution attempts to explain in terms of the antecedent, merely. According to the idealistic view the true nature of the cause becomes apparent only in the effect. Ultimate explanation must look to the end of the process. This, then, is a second limitation set upon evolution as final explanation.

The principle of evolution in its explanation of the world-

process marks off the four fairly well-defined stages, the cosmical, the chemical, the organic, and the rational. Le Conte describes evolution through these several stages, as "continuous progressive change according to certain laws and by means of resident forces." In this conception it will be noted (*a*) that the evolutionist regards the world as a unity which has within it the principle of self-development, and (*b*) that this unity gives rise to new forms of reality. Reality then is an organic system containing within itself its own principle of development—a principle of development or activity, which, while retaining its identity, originates new and qualitatively distinct forms of energy, *culminating in the self-conscious activity of man*. Evolution, finding its last and highest form in the progress of man, is not therefore the emergence of something out of nothing, but the manifestation of that which from another point of view eternally is.

On the basis of this ontological construction of evolution, namely, that existence means existence for some consciousness, and that the final standard of worth is found in the final stage of the process, it is assumed that the process of Reality as we find it in experience is the gradual manifestation of a living, self-determining Spirit, creative in nature and in the human life of man, not different in kind from the human consciousness in which it manifests itself most fully. (Compare Spencer's statement found in *Principles of Sociology*, § 659: 'Consequently, the final outcome of that speculation commenced by primitive man, is that the Power manifested throughout the Universe distinguished as material, is the same Power which in ourselves wells up under the form of consciousness'; also Huxley's statement in *Evolution and Morality*, p. 35: 'In man there lies a fund of energy, operating intelligently and so far akin to that which pervades the universe that it is competent to influence and modify the cosmic process.')

There are various ways, of course, in which the relation of the individual life to this Spiritual Principle may be conceived. Three may be noted: (*a*) the monistic type, represented by Spinoza, (*b*) the monadistic type, represented by Leibnitz, (*c*) the organic type, represented by Aristotle and Hegel. The Organic conception, recognizing the demand of intelligence to see in the world a real unity of elements, and of the moral nature for some relative independence of the elements within the unity, seems to do fuller justice than either of the others to the facts as well

as the needs of life. The philosophical basis, then, on which the doctrine of the syllabus rests is that of an idealistic monism — the monism which recognizes a spiritual principle revealed in nature and in human life: in that common reason of humanity to which nature is organic, which unites mankind and is the ultimate source of that upward movement which constitutes human progress.

¶ VI. CERTAIN IMPLICATIONS OF THE IDEALISTIC CONSTRUCTION OF EVOLUTION

Philosophical interpretation begins with facts vitally related in experience and attempts to discover their implications. To indicate the significance for the theory of education of the two hypotheses, evolution and idealism, is the task of subsequent sections. In the present connection it is necessary to indicate some of the more important implications of the general interpretation of experience advanced in the preceding section.

1. An analogy from a lower order of existence is an insufficient explanation of a higher order of existence. (Compare the phrases 'mental assimilation,' 'organic function,' 'society as an organism,' 'adjustment to environment,' *etc.*) The higher as the more perfectly realized existence interprets the lower, (*i. e.*, the incomplete and imperfect existence,) by showing the purpose of the latter. It is important, further, to distinguish between the *origin* of an institution, and its *validity* or *worth*. The ethical significance of the family, for example, at the present time is not affected by its origin. This is true also of the other institutions, and of art, morality and religion.

2. If in social evolution is found the last and highest manifestation of the Principle which is at work in the world, philosophy must gain the materials for its account of the nature of Reality for the most part in the social and ethical life of man.

3. Man apart from nature becomes an unreal abstraction. The world without and the world within are not two separated worlds, but are necessary counterparts of each other. Nature, accordingly, cannot be treated as a mere mechanism. Since the world cannot be defined apart from mind, it is plastic to mind: it is virtually what the mind makes of it. It has ministered to mind as a means of expression. It is plastic to man as Reason.

Civilization is a witness to the correspondence between the course of nature and the mind of man; a witness also to the adaptation of nature to the education of human intelligence. In their larger significance nature and civilization are phases of one spiritual movement.

4. Evolution and Idealism together find in the movement towards completer individualization (through differentiation and integration) a principle of interpretation for the organic and social processes. This principle of individuality must occupy a central position in any interpretation of social evolution. The true nature of the human individual consists in a process through which he comes to be what in 'idea' he is. Education has its center in personality.

5. On the other hand, since on the idealistic theory the world in its completeness is the manifestation of a meaning or purpose in a life, the ideal of the individual must move within the limits of that larger order which is working itself out in the world.

REFERENCES:

- (a) Concerning the doctrine of Evolution,—Baldwin, *Development and Evolution*, also, *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*; Clodd, *Primer of Evolution*; Cope, *Primary Factors of Organic Evolution*; Darwin, *Origin of Species*; Huxley, *Evolution and Ethics*; Osborne, *From the Greeks to Darwin*; Royce, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*; Spencer, *First Principles*.
- (b) For materials concerning the interpretation of the meaning of infancy outlined above, consult, Butler, 'Anaximander on the Prolongation of Infancy in Man,' in *Classical Studies in Honor of Henry Drisler*, also, *Meaning of Education*, pp. 3-34; Chamberlain, *The Child*, pp. 1-9; Drummond, *Ascent of Man*; Fiske, *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, II, chs. 16, 21, 22; *Destiny of Man*, pp. 35-76, also, *Through Nature to God*; Tyler, *The Whence and Whither of Man*.
- (c) Concerning the doctrine of Idealism,—Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*; Caird (E) art. "Metaphysics" in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, also, *Social Philosophy of Comte*; Caird (J), *Philosophy of Religion*; Fraser, *Philosophy of Theism*; Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*; Haldane, *The Pathway to Reality*; Howison, *The Limits of Evolution*; McTaggart, *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*; Mellone, *Philosophical Criticism and Construction*; Paulsen, *Introduction to Philosophy*; Ritchie, *Darwin and Hegel*; Royce, *The World and the Individual*; Schiller, *Humanism*; Schurman, *Ethical Import of Darwinism*; Sorley, *Ethics of Naturalism*; Sturt, *Personal Idealism*; Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*; Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*; Watson, *Christianity and Idealism*.

FURTHER PROBLEMS FOR STUDY:

1. The relation between the natural and the social order.
2. Is education a natural science?
3. The categories of potentiality, purpose, change, individuality, activity.
4. 'Origin' and 'validity' in ethics and education.
5. Implications of the educational process.

III. PHILOSOPHY OF THE HISTORY OF EDUCATION

¶ VII. THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

In attempting to discover an answer to the question, What is the life of man? Plato says that it is not best to begin with the study of the life of an individual man, but first of all to look at human nature where it can be seen on a large scale, or "write large," as he says, in the broad outlines of history and human society. In history is to be found the growing realization of that system of life which is proper to true human nature. To history we must have recourse for the *method* of spiritual evolution, conceived as a system. The present section attempts to sketch in barest outlines a methodology such as will furnish our third educational foundation.

1. Historical theories: three types, (a) indeterministic type, (b) biological type, (c) teleological type.
2. Reasons for accepting the teleological view: (a) the adaptation of environment to personality; (b) without the tendency to self-maintenance and race-maintenance there is no 'struggle for existence,' (c) the tendency to organization implies purpose — The apparent antagonism between nature and the moral life — Civilization as the last, complex, but orderly and purposeful phase in the evolution of life — Through history the unfolding of a moral purpose and the progress of a spiritual discipline.
3. Man and nature — Man as the interpretation and interpreter of nature — Nature as intelligible and man intelligent — The natural conditions of life — Development of the feeling for nature — The religion of nature.
4. 'Activity' as the fundamental datum in individual and race psychology — 'Action' as a fundamental category of historical synthesis — 'Social' experience — Society as a medium

for the communication and transmission of experience — The gradual projection of social tendencies into social ideals — Social heredity through (a) tradition, (b) education — Growth of experience through (a) increase in its objective content, (b) the number of its cognizers.

¶ VIII. THE 'CONTENT' OF CIVILIZATION

In the following analysis of the more important elements of civilization, the attempt is made to indicate such as have been (a) persistent, (b) cultural, *i. e.*, distinguishing man from the animals, (c) of service in enabling man to progress independently of mere heredity and natural selection. Civilization has its basis in the *active moulding* of his environment by man in the interests of human life — The gradual transition from the moulding of nature to the moulding of mind — Property — Invention of tools — Means of communication — Education.

Civilization, then, as a progressive articulation and realization of human nature, implies:

1. *Science, as Knowledge and as Instrument of Control.* The subjugation of nature through work, observation, invention and coöperation — The significance of productive industry in determining social structure, the primary culture manifestations, and religious ideas — The sciences as the methods of controlling the processes of social life — Their significance in the material, intellectual and ethical life of man.

2. *Language.* In the history of the race language performs a two-fold function: (a) it makes classification of experiences and reasoning possible, and thus, science, philosophy and history, and (b) it provides a means for the distribution and transmission of experience.

3. *Art and Literature.* Nature and art — Art and science — The nature sense in art and literature — Art as a social phenomenon and a social function — The element of idealism in common life — Art as an expression of popular feelings and ideals — Judgments of worth — Art as liberating and deepening human experience — The element of nationality in art — Art and religion — Art and literature as factors in social evolution.

4. *Social and Political Institutions.* The conception of a 'state of nature' — The theory of 'natural' rights — Is mor-

ality the basis of law, or law of morality? — The relation of custom to law and morality — The systematization of custom — What determines rights — Society as maker of 'values' — Justice — The function of institutions in the distribution and transmission of the spiritual possessions of society.

5. *Religion*. Religious influence of the natural world — Nature and social life as sources of religious ideas — Definition of religions in terms of their common principle rather than in terms of their content — Essential unity of the religious principle — Stages in the development of the religious consciousness — Religion as a social phenomenon — Historical relations of religion and morality — The *ethical* movement in religion.

¶ IX. MODERN CIVILIZATION AS AFFECTED BY THE CIVILIZATIONS OF GREECE, ROME AND JUDEA

1. *The Greek View of Life*. The ideal of individual freedom in thought and action — The regulative principle in Greek life — The discovery of *method* in thought and action — Greek science and philosophy — Art and idealism in Greek life — The moral element in Greek culture — Contribution to the theory of education and culture.

2. *Roman Life and Character*. The characteristic Roman virtues — The discipline of the will through law and order — Roman imperialism — The Roman *humanitas* — The preparation of the world and the preparation of the spirit.

3. *Judaism and Christianity*. The natural and the spiritual — The unity and spirituality of God — The Hebrew sense of sin a higher idealism than that of Greece and Rome — The conception of personality — The new synthesis — The Christian view of human nature — Christianity as a religion of reconciliation and adjustment — Christianity and the ideal of service — The social conscience and the social problem as outcome of Christianity — Hebraism — Hellenism — Humanism.

¶ X. THE THEORY OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION

1. The theory assumes: (a) the *unity* of mankind; (b) a *development* of man — Advantage of the theory — The unity of mankind manifesting itself in an organic process of development

— The fact of social heredity — The common intellectual life of humanity — The evolution of morality — How the history of man's development throws light upon the individual life — The ethics of the individual life in relation to the ethics of the social whole — Progressive character of moral ideals — Man as the *educable* animal — Self-consciousness — Social evolution through *conscious* selection — Education as 'conscious' evolution, the last and highest phase of the evolutionary process — The transmission of the spiritual possessions of the race.

2. The postulates of Idealistic Ethics. The moral ideal, while dependent on social relations, is not, ultimately, their product — The metaphysical ground of social union or community.

¶ XI. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HISTORY OF EDUCATION

The aim of a philosophy of the history of education is two-fold: (*a*) to indicate the unity and continuity of the educational process with the wider social process, and (*b*) to trace the parallelism between educational theory and general philosophical theory. The educational problem is always a social outcome. In like manner the dominating philosophical thought of a period has a formative influence in its educational theory. In many instances, of course, this influence has been greater in proportion as it was unconscious and indirect. It was, nevertheless, just as inevitable.

1. Typical forms of educational thought and practice as expressions of the wider social life: (*a*) Chinese life and education; (*b*) Athenian life and education; (*c*) Theory of life and education during the Middle Ages; (*d*) Effect of separation of church and state on education; (*e*) National education and the social ideals of the present.

2. Types of the parallelism between philosophical theory and educational theory: (*a*) The ethical individualism of the Sophists; (*b*) The philosophical and educational theories of Plato; (*c*) The principle of authority in relation to Mediæval education; (*d*) The Cartesian dualism and the separation of subject-matter and method; (*e*) The solutions of Empiricism and Rationalism; (*f*) The individualism of Rousseau and education 'according to nature'; (*g*) Results of the Kantian criticism; (*h*) The dualism between subject-matter and method in present educational theory.

REFERENCES:

- (a) Concerning the general concept of civilization, consult, Bonar, *Philosophy and Political Economy*; Buckle, *History of Civilization*; Caird, *Evolution of Religion*; Crozier, *History of Intellectual Development*, also, *Civilization and Progress*; Draper, *Intellectual Development of Europe*; Droysen, *The Principles of History*; Dunning, *A History of Political Theories*; Fairbairn, *The Philosophy of the Christian Religion*; Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History*; Guizot, *History of Civilization*; Hegel, *Philosophy of History*; Kidd, *Principles of Western Civilization*; Le Bon, *The Psychology of Peoples*; Lecky, *History of European Morals*; Lotze, *Microcosmus*; Merz, *History of European Thought*; Pearson, *The Grammar of Science*; Spencer, *Sociology*; Temple, *Essays and Reviews*; Tiele, *Elements of the Science of Religion*; Wake, *The Evolution of Morality*; Ward, *The Psychic Factors of Civilization*; Wedgwood, *The Moral Ideal*.
- (b) On the contributions to civilization of Greece, Rome and Judea, consult, Butcher, *Some Aspects of the Greek Genius*; Caird, *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*; Campbell, *Greek Religion*; De Coulange, *The Ancient City*; Forrest, *The Christ of History and of Experience*; Fowler, *The City State*; Gardner, *Exploratio Evangelica*; Gill, *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Empire*; Hatch, *The Influence of Greek Ideas upon the Christian Church*; Kuenan, *Judaism and Christianity*; Mahaffy, *Greek Life*; Mommsen, *History of Rome*; Pater, *Plato and Platonism*; Renan, *Influence of Rome on Christianity*; Taylor, *Ancient Ideals*; Toy, *Judaism and Christianity*; Watson, *Christianity and Idealism*; Zeller, *History of Greek Philosophy*.
- (c) On social evolution, consult, Alexander, *Moral Order and Progress*; Baldwin, *Development and Evolution*; Kidd, *Social Evolution*; MacIntosh, *From Comte to Benjamin Kidd*; Nash, *Genesis of the Social Conscience*; Ritchie, *Darwin and Hegel*; Schurman, *The Ethical Import of Darwinism*; Sorley, *Ethics of Naturalism*; Stephen, *A Science of Ethics*; Wallace, *Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics*; Williams, *Evolution and Ethics*.
- (d) On the philosophy of the history of education, consult, Aristotle, *Ethics*; Bacon, *Novum Organum*; Buchner, *Kant's Educational Theory*; Comenius, *The Great Didactic*; Davidson, *A History of Education*, also, *The Education of the Greek People*; Froebel, *Education of Man*; Goethe, *Wilhelm Meister*; Herbart, *The Science of Education*; à Kempis, *The Imitation of Christ*; Nettleship, *Lectures on the Republic of Plato*; Paulsen, *Historical Development of the Universities of Germany*; Pestalozzi, *How Gertrude teaches her Children*; Plato, *Republic*; Quintilian, *Institutes of Oratory*; Rabelais, *Life of Gargantua*; Rashdall, *Universities in Europe in the Middle Ages*; Rousseau, *Emile*; Royce, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*.

FURTHER PROBLEMS FOR STUDY:

1. Education and the national tradition.
2. Nationality as an element in the evolution of education.
3. The influence of religious ideas in the development of institutions.
4. Theories of knowledge in relation to educational theory.
5. The permanent elements of civilization.
6. Greek civilization and the discovery of 'method.'
7. Plato's educational theory as an outcome of his social philosophy.
8. The psychological basis of Aristotle's educational theory.
9. Scholasticism as a preparation for the Renaissance.
10. The influence of historical systems of philosophy on educational theory.

IV. THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF EDUCATION — PERSONALITY AND ENVIRONMENT

¶ XII. PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION AS A CRITIQUE OF EDUCATIONAL PRESUPPOSITIONS

Education is one element within experience. As a fact of experience it is concerned with the relation of an individual to his environment. In a philosophy of education it is not sufficient merely to assume the possibility of the educational process: some account must be given of the necessities of thought prior to and presupposed in that process. In order to answer the question, 'What ought education to aim at?' the prior question, 'What is a person, both in himself and in his environment?' must be dealt with. What, then, does the mind do? What is the method of its operation? What is the ultimate nature of the material operated upon? What are the mutual relations of personality and environment?

¶ XIII. PERSONALITY AS A PRESUPPOSITION OF EDUCATION

The outline of a doctrine of personality which follows is based upon three points of view: (a) experience an *organic* unity; (b) the *functional* view of mind; (c) the *social origin* of the distinction between the self and not-self.

I. *Experience as an organic unity.* It is, perhaps, most satisfactory to approach the question through a consideration of several typical statements of the nature of mind and its relation to the outer world:

(a) The Cartesian conception of mind, according to which consciousness and matter are absolute disparates. The world, or nature, is the opposite of mind; so far as its own structure is concerned, neither embodying nor reflecting intelligence. Criticism of the Cartesian position.

(b) Leibnitz's view of mind, a reaction against (i) Dualism, and (ii) Empiricism. According to this view the material world is a gradual evolution *in* consciousness. The mind's knowledge does not come to it from without, since, fundamentally, it cannot be influenced by any other substance. Educational implications — Criticism.

(c) The result of the Kantian analysis. The fundamental significance of the 'Critical' theory of knowledge consisted in its attempt to mediate between the extreme position of Empiricism and Dualism on the one hand, and of Rationalism on the other, — in other words, to show that in the development or creation of the mind, involution is as necessary as evolution. According to Kant's view the natural system of objects (matter) is one element in a spiritual system of experience which includes and transcends it. The fact that the mind comes to itself through a consciousness of the external world would indicate that this very consciousness of the externality of things is itself an element in the spiritual unity of the world. In other words, in order to attain any valid explanation of knowledge or experience, Kant insists upon the *organic* relation between mind and matter, intelligence and the world. The outcome of his criticism, then, is this: Neither matter nor mind are ready-made, self-existing entities, isolable from each other. The mind is not something equipped with faculties to appropriate the world: nor is the world preëxisting and all prepared to be appropriated. Both the mind and the world are the outcome of a unitary process, and only when we isolate through abstraction the terminal aspects of that process, and forget its unitary character, do we have the dualism of mind and matter, intelligence and the world. The argument may be stated in slightly different form. Kant held that the natural system of objects is one element in a spiritual system of experience which includes and transcends it. In other words, the 'objective world' may be regarded as the environment in which the self realizes itself. It is interesting to compare this epistemological doctrine with the Spencerian doctrine of life. According to

Spencer the life-process is one through which an individual maintains its identity in change by means of an external (so-called) environment which makes the change necessary. In both the psychical and the biological process the 'environment' is relative to the nature of the individual environed. In neither case, therefore, can it be viewed merely as something "outside," or as an external determinant of the psychical or biological individual, but rather and fundamentally as an element in the process of the individual's self-maintenance and self-development.

2. *The functional view of mind.*

(a) Difficulties inherent in the empirical and rationalistic interpretations of experience — The evolutionary view of mind — Without a complete departure from reality, consciousness cannot be abstracted from its relations. Experience, as we know it, is dynamic: it is *process* — Experience as 'activity' — 'Activity' as the unit of psychical life. The self or subject as *agent*, the object as *situation or conditions* (environment) are correlative aspects of experience. There is no 'self' that is not an effort directed to the accomplishment of something. The self, then, has reality as a centre of experience, the bearer of the concrete life of an individual. The synthesis of knowledge and of conduct which composes that content arises from the self's own activity and in its own degree expresses the intrinsic character of the individual. Voluntarism, accordingly, regards the entire conscious life as gathered up and most completely manifest in activity. According to this view, experience is dynamic, the activity is the self in *functional* relation to its *object*. This identification of the activity with the self, the activity by which the self expresses itself and comes to consciousness of itself, constitutes the ethical view of freedom.

(b) Certain psychological implications of Pragmatism — The 'feeling' and 'cognitive' phases of experience as connecting links — The organic connection between thought and action — Thought as a part of action — Personality as a willing subject — The teleological character of mental process.

(c) Pragmatism and the teleological interpretation of experience — The world of values and duties as the "object" of the self — Certain educational implications.

3. *The social origin of the distinction between the 'self' and 'not-self.'* The activity of the self in the process of experi-

ence — Self and self-consciousness — The dominance of the *individualistic* method in psychology — The social factor in the development of self-consciousness — Individuality as *function*, including (a) capacity and (b) environment, raised to consciousness through social activities — Implications for educational theory.

4. Gathering together the results of previous analysis it may be held that:

(a) The reality of the world conceived as the object of possible experience implies the perpetual presence of a spiritual principle immanent in nature and humanity.

(b) The self and the world as the terminal aspects of a unitary process of experience are communicated to us in inseparable correlation. Because of this interdependence of the spiritual (the self) and the material (object, sphere of action, or environment), the spiritual nevertheless transcending, the material (in biological terms, 'environment') is everywhere seen to be the indispensable medium through which the self manifests itself. Heredity and environment are, therefore, not 'things-in-themselves' set over in mechanical juxtaposition against the self. They are, in reality, phases of the actual, concrete, working self.

(c) The self, as including (i) consciousness of self and (ii) consciousness of object, is at once permanent and changing. In the self, in virtue of consciousness, is found a process *returning upon itself* in such a way as to retain its existing quality or individuality. The self, therefore, is permanent because it remains one in its life-process. It is no fixed entity because it is one in and through the unity and continuity of its activity. Thus self-activity is the essence of personality. Man's conscious activity is thus the condition of the possibility of his rationality. The true permanence of the self lies in the process of its growth in a social environment.

(d) The human self is not merely a part of the universe of experience and conscious of being a part, but it is conscious also of being subject to its laws. It is capable, therefore, not merely of development but also of discerning the law of its development, of returning upon itself, contrasting the ideal with the actual, and thus making progress possible. Thus man as the subject of education is spiritual; in other words, the fundamental condition of his development and education lies in his capacity as a self-

conscious subject, distinguishing himself from the objects he knows and the ends he chooses, to return upon himself and set up ideals to realize. These ideals of possible development, while contrasted with the actual, cannot be in contradiction to the actual; they are rather the actual truly seen, *i. e.*, in their ideal nature, as those ends towards which all previous development had been striving.

(*e*) Keeping in mind, then, (i) the contention advanced in a preceding section that the world-process, as we know it, is the expression of a *meaning*, (ii) the social factor in the development of self-consciousness, and (iii) that its purpose can be realized only through its own free activity, we may say that the progress of the self consists in *conformity to the purpose* which is being worked out through the whole nature of things. (The demand for a complete statement of this purpose would be irrational.) The origin and development of the individual lies, therefore, in the meaning of the individual.

¶ XIV. THE NATURE OF ENVIRONMENT

1. From preceding analyses it will be noted that the distinction between thing and environment arises only in self-consciousness. A very persistent tendency at the present time is to conceive environment as acting upon the individual in a purely mechanical way. Changes of 'function and structure' are said to be 'produced' by environment, in a way quite similar to the account of Empiricism. This method of viewing the mind is, in reality, a relic of Dualism.

2. On the other hand if the analysis given in the preceding section be true, it follows:

(*a*) The environment of a person is in reality one side of a spiritual process, throughout relative to the specific nature of the person whose environment it is.

(*b*) It, moreover, is not an unchanging form, but a changing process. It is changing because the person (whose environment it is) changes. It forms for the self an interrelated whole, or rather, it is in a process of organization, each part existing only in relation to the others: in which, moreover, there is ultimately nothing but the work of mind.

(*c*) The self is not merely a part of a material and a social

order but is conscious of this relationship. This consciousness implies, at least to some degree, the consciousness of a wider order, the cosmic, which includes and transcends them. In the deepest sense, then, a man's environment is not merely the material or social world but the entire cosmic order of which he forms a part.

(d) The environment of a person is the medium of his self-realization. Through environment the self works towards its realization. Nature, civilization, the cosmic order have as their principle of unity that same self-consciousness which makes of the individual a person. In coming, therefore, to knowledge of and conformity with the order of nature, the life of humanity, the moral order of the world, the person takes the only way to a knowledge of himself, of coming to consciousness of self.

(e) On the basis of this community of nature between the self and its environment the nature and possibility of 'adaptation' or 'adjustment' (so frequently used to describe the educational process) becomes intelligible. The self through its inherent activity is able to maintain itself in a medium that is not alien but fundamentally of one kin with itself. Its activity (*i. e.*, its adaptation as *intelligence* and *will*) is not a consequence of the self, but its essence. Not only is the self able to maintain itself in its environment through adaptation, but through the same process of adaptation to realize itself, for the reason that knowledge of and conformity to the universal order which forms its environment is essentially the process through which the self is realized.

REFERENCES:

- (a) Concerning the Cartesian view of mind, consult, Caird, art. *Cartesianism*, also, *Metaphysics*, in *Encyclopædia Britannica*; Smith, *Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy*; Watson, *An Outline of Philosophy*. Concerning Leibnitz's view of mind, consult, Dewey, *Leibnitz's Human Understanding*; Latta, *The Monadology of Leibnitz*. Concerning the Critical philosophy, consult, Caird, *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*.
- (b) For materials concerning the functional view of mind, consult, Baldwin, *Development and Evolution*; Dewey, *Studies in Logical Theory*; Hobhouse, *Mind in Evolution*; James, *Principles of Psychology*; Ladd, *A Theory of Reality*; Münsterberg, *Psychology and Life*; Paulsen, *Introduction to Philosophy*; Schiller, *Humanism*; Stout, *Analytic Psychology*; Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*.

- (c) Concerning the social factor in the development of self-consciousness, consult, Baldwin, *Mental Development*, I-II; Bosanquet, *The Psychology of the Moral Self*; Muirhead, *Elements of Ethics*; Royce, *Studies in Good and Evil*, also, *Outlines of Psychology*; Stephen, *Science of Ethics*; Stout, *Manual of Psychology*; Wallace, *Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics*; Wundt, *Ethics*, III.
- (d) For materials concerning the doctrine of the "self," consult, Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*; Caird, art. *Metaphysics*, *loc. cit.*; Dewey, *Study of Ethics*; Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*; Haldane, *Pathway to Reality*, I-II; Harris, *Logic of Hegel*, also, *Psychologic Foundations of Education*; Illingworth, *Personality, Human and Divine*; Lotze, *Metaphysics*; Mackenzie, *Introduction to Social Philosophy*; McTaggart, *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*; Mellone, *Philosophical Criticism and Construction*; Ormond, *Foundations of Knowledge*; Royce, *The World and the Individual*, II, also, *The Conception of Immortality*; Sorley, *Ethics of Naturalism*; Sturt, *Personal Idealism*; Taylor, *The Problem of Conduct*; Watson, *An Outline of Philosophy*.

FURTHER PROBLEMS FOR STUDY:

1. Philosophical and educational implications of the evolutionary view of mind.
2. Education as 'world-building.'
3. Critique of Herbart's view of the nature of mind.
4. The meaning of 'experience.'
5. The historical meanings of 'personality.'
6. Implications of the *social* character of consciousness.

V. THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY

¶ XV. PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIETY

1. The process of individual experience arises within the wider process of social life. Apart from this wider process it would remain unintelligible. The normal individual life is life in society, and life in society is the life disclosed in the *common* life of men — Industry, language, morality, education as phases of the social unity — The organic unity of the problem of social progress — Education as a form of conscious intervention in the process of social life — Educational theory an organic part of a philosophy of society.

2. For the purposes of a philosophy of education a fuller discussion of social theory would center about three questions: (a) the *location* of the educational process in the wider social process; (b) the *standard of worth* for the estimation of social products and achievements; (c) the transformation of *tendencies* in education into an *ideal* of human endeavor that would be at once coherent, concrete and appropriate.

¶ XVI. TYPICAL CONCEPTIONS OF THE RELATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL TO SOCIETY

1. The individualistic or monadistic view — Society an aggregate of individuals — Historical illustrations of the theory — Influence of Individualism in establishing the moral value of individual personality.

2. The socialistic or monistic view — Illustrations — ‘Man is a mere abstraction and there is nothing real but humanity.’

3. The mechanical or dualistic view — Illustrations.

4. The organic view which attempts to adjust the claims of the other three in a way which, on the whole, seems more conformable to the facts. The remainder of the section is, therefore, given over to a little more detailed statement of its meaning and its more important implications.

¶ XVII. THE CONCEPTION OF SOCIETY AS AN ORGANISM

The following outline proceeds on the assumption that *society* is essentially a *psychical organization*; in other words, that in the social constitution of human nature is found the factor which adapts individuals one to another in such a way that it becomes the ground of unity in the manifold forms of human interest and activity. The organic view of society postulates: (a) identity of interest between the individual and society, and (b) that the possibility of the development of the individual lies in participation in the social consciousness and social activities. This principle of the coincidence of individual and social welfare occupies a place in the sphere of morals analogous to that which the principle of the uniformity of nature occupies in the domain of knowledge.

1. Development of the organic conception — Plato, Hobbes, Spencer — Spencer's comparison between a society and an animal organism — The danger inherent in the biological analogy — Inadequate, if not distinctly perverse — The question not so much, 'Is society an organism?' as, 'What is an organic society?'

2. Consideration of Mackenzie's view of society as an organism — Examination of his view that the *sociality* of man depends on the possession of self-consciousness — The difficulty in the 'rationalistic' view seems to arise from its neglect of 'function.' The organic conception must treat the individual as a *functional* element in a *larger functional whole*. The individual and society are not two separate modes of being: rather they are two modes of activity within the unity of the social process.

3. The reality of the social mind — Its reality as process — The 'structural' and the 'functional' points of view in social psychology — 'Activity' as the elementary fact of social as of individual psychology — The conception of the *members of a group acting together* — Intrinsic relations — 'Action' as the bond between the subjective and the objective — The social mind is thus more than a mere aggregate of individual processes. It is a functional, active unity. As a psychical existence, society is essentially a process. The social mind is, then, simply the societary process. In it is found the organic, *i. e.*, functional unity of various psychical processes in a single, unitary process.

4. Vicariousness as a fundamental element in the social process — Differentiation and integration — 'Interchange of service' consequent upon interdependence between the members of society.

5. The unifying element in social life. If society is a psychical organization its unifying bond cannot be found in the physical conditions of the external world. What then is the ultimate nature of that inner bond which holds human beings together? Some of the best known theories are the following: (a) Force; (b) Economic need; (c) Religion; (d) 'Consciousness of kind'; (e) Thought; (f) The idea of a 'common good.' In the light of analyses made in previous sections the notion of a 'Common Good' is accepted as affording the most satisfactory explanation of the social unity. This, of course, is not to deny the important influences which Force, Economic Interest, Sym-

pathy, Thought, Consciousness of kind, and Religion, have exerted in the integration of society.

6. The ideal of a common good as the unifying element in social life. This view maintains that every society exists through the recognition by its members of a common good. Certain phases of the argument in favor of this conception: (a) A mere aggregate of individuals united by no *social* bond whatever is not a society; (b) 'Action' is the elementary fact for social psychology; (c) The social character of consciousness; (d) Teleological interpretation of action; (e) Each member capable of self-consciousness, *i. e.*, the power of comprehending what is implied in his social instincts. Activity (existing for the individual as something more than mere 'potentiality' only in virtue of the objective, *i. e.*, social, conditions in which it becomes actual) *plus* self-consciousness, or rather activity, whose meaning is apprehended by self-consciousness, makes human society possible; (f) The objective conditions of the realization of the common good lie in the various forms of social organization.

The fundamental bond of social life is, then, none other than morality, which consists essentially in the presence of some phase of the social purpose as a moving ideal before the individual mind; in short, in the social constitution of the individual will or mind, as Aristotle would say. In society, in order to exist, the individual member must to some degree give up his own selfish indulgence for the sake of a common good, for the general will. From the beginning society has been held together not merely by 'economic necessity' and 'consciousness of kind,' but by some leaven of goodness working in it. Conduct is good or bad according as it tends to social well-being or the reverse. From the beginning the individual has felt (often, it is true, dimly) that his personal satisfaction cannot exclude, but must include the realization of the social well-being. The bond of unity in social life and civilization is righteousness of life. The form of virtue is constant, the content is ever changing. The moral element as the fundamental social bond is not one inserted suddenly at some point alongside the other elements; nor is it their product. It has been present throughout, though more fully known and realized in the higher stages of civilization. Morality is the law of all life that is truly human.

¶ XVIII. SOCIAL MEMBERSHIP: THE ETHICAL DOCTRINE OF PERSONALITY

From the preceding analysis it follows:

1. The social purpose is the ideal of a social or moral organism in which the capacities of each shall have opportunity for their fullest realization, and in which the perfection of each shall contribute to the perfection of all. The common good, in other words, is identical with the complete development of all the members of the community.

2. The individual good is a common good, and the perfect realization of a man's nature is possible only in and through the identification of his personal good with the universal good. The measure of morality, therefore, is the actual identification of the private self with the universal self.

3. The social purpose or the *idea* of human perfection as the *moving force in social evolution* has taken form and body in various types of association. Man in virtue of self-consciousness has been enabled to comprehend (to a degree) the meaning of these forms of association in relation to his destiny. Hence it is that human history is largely a record of the progressive changes made in the various forms of social organization.

4. Self-realization is a process in which the self (*a*) comes to be more completely defined, *i. e.*, individualized, (*b*) but *defined* through its *membership* in the larger unity. Personality is no self-contained atomic existence. A moral personality is one which is discerning the meaning of, and executing a purpose in harmony with, the moral order, and whose life is being clothed with the wealth of human relationships.

5. Obligation, then, for a moral personality consists not merely in adjusting himself to his environment, but of adjusting his environment to that higher *ideal* towards which his environment is striving. Moral obligation thus compels the individual to the realization of the self and the service of society.

Note. — For materials concerning topics outlined in this section, consult list at the close of Section VI.

VI. MORAL INSTITUTIONS**¶ XIX. HUMAN INSTITUTIONS AND THE IDEAL OF A COMMON GOOD**

The fundamental ethical need of man is self-realization. The form in which that need has been most completely met in the history of the race has been the identification of a private with some common good: society, in turn, is constituted by such identification. Herein is found the basis of the moral life of man. The individual comes to himself through membership in the social organism, an organism in which an ideal of some common good is recognized by its members. Whenever a man obeys a law, does a so-called virtuous action, or participates in the life of any one of the various human institutions, he to that degree identifies his own good with the general good, even though he may understand only very imperfectly the significance of his action. This ethical principle, the ideal of a common good, has become embodied in the various virtues, laws and institutions. The social organism is the incarnation of man's inner life: virtues are the subjective habits of his will, and institutions are their outward embodiment. Through these the individual has realized himself, and has at the same time subserved the realization of others. Morality is thus essentially a language by means of which personal wills have communication one with another.

1. The study of human institutions is practically a study of the various forms in which the principle of association is seen to operate in society. From one point of view association is the integration of individuals into the *common social process*. Society is concentrated in institutions, and an interpretation of institutions is an interpretation of society. They may be studied from a two-fold point of view: (a) of structure, or what they are; (b) of function, or what they do. An institution does not exist simply for itself, but for some purpose. The consideration of *function* is the question of importance for our present aim. Once more we revert to Aristotle's distinction between the origin of an institution and the purpose or end which it comes to serve. There cannot, of course, be any absolute separation: on the other hand, the mere natural history of an institution is not a complete

explanation. It does not satisfy as an interpretation of the institution, nor sanction it as reasonable. The significant question for the philosophy of education is this, 'How far and in what ways have institutions made possible the spiritual life of man?'

2. Society as the medium of experience — Institutions as meeting-points for the functional activity of their members — Foci of social influence and experience; of a common thought and action content — Institutions (*a*) as *facts* in a present and actual society; (*b*) as *centres* for the *distribution* and *transmission* of 'ideas'; (*c*) as a more or less permanent *system of purposes* — Institutions as the common substance of the individual and the social mind.

¶ XX. THE MORAL VALUE OF INSTITUTIONS

Uniting the principles of Evolution and Idealism with the notion of a 'common good,' the two important functions which Institutions perform may be said to be these:

1. They unify men. To unify men is to moralize them. In prescribing the general methods of response to social situations, institutions exercise an authority and control essential to the realization of the individual. They thus constitute a system of control, formative in the intellectual and moral development of the individual. Institutions are the expression of human interdependence; the realized idea of humanity. Herein is the ground of social obligation. In institutions is embodied the law imposed upon the actual self by the ideal self. To some degree the outcome on the part of individuals of voluntary adaptation one to another, but for the most part emerging first of all without any far-reaching purpose, institutions have conserved the social order and provided the means for the realization of the individual. While it is freely admitted that in their development the ideal of the realization of the capacities of the human spirit was but seldom consciously presented, yet in the consciousness of man there must have supervened a universal principle, which, *however dimly*, enabled him to set himself up as an end to be realized, and to present to this consciousness persons other than himself. It is this universal principle in consciousness which, in the *development and progress* of the human race, has been the immanent life of individual and social activity.

2. They transmit experience and thus preserve the continuity of the spiritual life of humanity. The doctrine of evolution maintains that nothing in the world is isolated: all is connected. There is nowhere atomism, but unity, relation, participation. Just as in nature truly seen, objects are closely united, and all dependent each on each, so are the generations of men united one to the other. Down through the ages there is this tide of spiritual life slowly accumulating, ever gathering in volume, wider, deeper, stronger. This fund of spiritual life, the slowly garnered experience of humanity, is civilization, and that which constitutes the environment of men. For the individual, at birth, it is his spiritual inheritance. It becomes his spiritual possession in a large and fruitful way only through education. From the ethical and, therefore, from the educational point of view civilization is the vicarious offering of the race to the individual to be used, if he will but appropriate it, for the perfecting of his nature, for the rich and varied expression of the personal life.

¶ XXI. THE MORAL INSTITUTIONS

Moral institutions, then, are the embodiments of those relations which men, living together in association for some common good, have found to minister to the realization of human life. Only in the postulate of the identity of the individual and the common good can a justification be found for the institutions through which men have sought satisfaction for their needs: only in their more perfect adjustment and coöperation will the unity of self-realization and of social service be more completely realized.

1. The moral significance of the family relationship — The origin of the family and the origin of civilization — Domestic education — Causes of decline of family life in the civilization of the present: (*a*) the modern movement towards freedom; (*b*) economic changes and the growth of large cities; (*c*) the disappearance of the ecclesiastical view of marriage — Ethical function of the home as a social institution.

2. The school as a form of institutional life. (See Section IX.)

3. The ethical significance of 'vocations' — The material conditions of life as part of a connected system — Teleological necessity of separate callings — Economic life as basis of labor

and property — Labor as expression of ability — Property as realization of will — Moral significance of 'division of labor' — The vocation as means of self-realization. (See also Section VII.)

4. The State as a moral institution — Society's method for securing the external conditions of the good life — Extension of the sphere of duty — Education through citizenship.

5. The church in relation to society — The church as the home of the spiritual life — The unity and interdependence of men — Religion and idealism in common life.

REFERENCES :

- (a) For materials concerning the theories of society outlined in Sections V-VI, consult, Aristotle, *Ethics*, and *Politics*; Baldwin, *Mental Development*, I-II; Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State*; Caird, *The Social Philosophy of Comte*; Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*; Mackenzie, *Introduction to Social Philosophy*; Small and Vincent, *Introduction to the Study of Society*; Ward, *Pure Sociology*.
- (b) Concerning the 'organic' view of society, consult, Alexander, *Moral Order and Progress*; Bradley, *Ethical Studies*; Dewey, *Outlines of Ethics*; Jones, in *Essays in Philosophical Criticism*; Mackenzie, *Introduction to Social Philosophy*; McTaggart, *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*.
- (c) Concerning the subject of 'moral institutions,' consult, Addams, *Democracy and Social Ethics*; Bosanquet, *Philosophical Theory of the State*; Caird, *Philosophy of Religion*; Coit, *Ethical Democracy*; Dewey, *School and Society*; Ely, *Social Aspects of Christianity*; Fairbairn, *Religion in History and Modern Life*; Freemantle, *The World as the Subject of Redemption*; Green, *Lectures on Political Obligation*; Harris (G), *Moral Evolution*; Harris (W. T.), *Psychologic Foundations of Education*; Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*; Henderson, *Social Elements*; Hobson, *The Social Problem*; Hyde, *Practical Idealism*; King, *Theology and the Social Consciousness*; MacCunn, *The Making of Character*; Mackenzie, *Introduction to Social Philosophy*, also, *Manual of Ethics*; Matthews, *Social Teaching of Jesus*; McKechnie, *The State and the Individual*; Muirhead, *Elements of Ethics*; Murray, *Introduction to Ethics*; Paulsen, *System of Ethics*; Peabody, *Jesus Christ and the Social Question*; Ritchie, *Natural Rights*; Ross, *Social Control*; Royce, *Religious Aspect of Philosophy*; Schurman, *Ethical Import of Darwinism*; Stephen, *Science of Ethics*; Wundt, *Ethics*.

FURTHER PROBLEMS FOR STUDY :

1. Is human law the basis of morality, or morality of human law?
2. Religion and the sanctions for social conduct.
3. Limits of state interference in the education of the individual.

4. The psychological basis of social organization.
5. Relations of conduct to social situations.
6. The qualities of the 'socialized' individual.
7. Coöperation among the moral institutions.

VII. THE ETHICS OF DEMOCRACY

¶ XXII. TRANSITIONAL CHARACTER OF THE SOCIETY OF THE PRESENT

1. The more important causes tending to modify modern social life are: (*a*) The progress of political democracy, leading to increased political interdependence; (*b*) The great industrial and commercial advance, leading to a unique development of the sciences and in turn tending to produce an almost absolute economic interdependence; (*c*) The progress of social democracy, and the modification of methods in religious and philanthropic activities made in response to the new social needs, and serving to quicken among men the sense of their moral and spiritual unity.

2. The significance of the progress in political democracy — Rise of Western democracy — Interpretation of Maine's statement: 'The modern popular government of our day is of purely English origin.' — The ideals of liberty, equality, fraternity — The fundamental political doctrine of Western democracy assumes the native equality of all men — Strictly understood, the ideal of equality is inapplicable to human beings — Understood as an assertion of the moral and spiritual worth of an individual as compared with a mere instrument — Equality as part of a social ideal — The individualism of democracy is ethical, not numerical — The justification of movements which make for a greater equalization of ways and means — The extension of the sphere of duty and responsibility — Political democracy depends for its stability on the education of its citizens.

3. Social results of the Industrial Revolution: (*a*) The substitution of the factory system for the domestic system of industry; (*b*) Growth of the spirit of competition; (*c*) Industrial depressions; (*d*) Certain socialistic tendencies; (*e*) A tendency to materialism in thought and life — The ethical significance of Plato's division of society into 'classes' — Vocations as mani-

festing abilities — The significance of *uniqueness of service* in the development of personality — The social organism as unity (social consciousness) in difference (individuality) — Modifications in the content and method of education.

4. While it must be admitted that in the transition to the new type of social life there has been a quickening among men of the sense of their moral and spiritual unity, yet it would be a task of some difficulty to prove that in the process of substituting the new political and industrial system for the older one the sense of ethical interdependence had kept pace with that of economic or even political interdependence: that the spirit of coöperation, of the labor of men for the good of man, had developed as rapidly as the spirit of competition.

¶ XXIII. THE ETHICS OF DEMOCRACY

In the two preceding sections it was maintained: (*a*) that society as actually constituted exists for the sake of an end which is fundamentally ethical; (*b*) that an examination of the fundamental institutions which compose society reveals this ideal at work as a formative influence in every personality that yields obedience to them; (*c*) that the principle of cohesion in social life and institutions is the ideal of a moral organism in which the capacities of each individual member shall have opportunity for their fullest realization, and in which the perfection of each shall contribute to the perfection of all; (*d*) that the moral conduct of the individual consists in a free and yet responsible ordering of his thoughts, affections and desires with a view to the realization of such a moral world. It is now contended that in this conception of the social purpose is found the ethical principle of democratic society. Moral personality is, therefore, the real presupposition and goal of the social process.

On the other hand, it was also maintained that from another point of view the social process may be formulated in terms of *vicariousness*. In this process there is a continuous interchange of services. A particular level of society represents a balancing of services between its members. So long as this exchange is real and proportional the social process remains equable. A period of tension arises whenever a group of members feel that the just exchange of services is interrupted or arrested. In such

a period there is a disturbance of the vicarious relations due to an unfair avoidance of responsibility on the part of some member or class within the social unity. In many cases where there is a disturbance of the social functioning there is undoubtedly a positive shirking of duty: it may very well be, however, that in the majority of instances, an individual, or a class within the social unity, has but lost for a time and has not yet regained the moral insight necessary to accommodation or adaptation within the modified social system.

An important phase, therefore, of the social problem of the present may be outlined as follows:

1. The ideal of democracy is the union of free persons in a common life. In a society that is completely moralized, *i. e.*, organized, the social order would not only be realized, but consciously realized under appropriate modifications by each member. A society is not truly organic, *i. e.*, completely moralized, until it has as many centers of conscious experience as it has members. Democracy is therefore endeavoring to develop a moral organism in which there is at once coöperation and scope for individual freedom.

2. The test of any type of society or civilization lies in its manner of distributing its spiritual possessions, of mediating its fund of spiritual experiences and values; and in its efficiency (by means of institutions, the state, vocations, education) in enabling the individual to enter upon his social inheritance, and thus to accommodate himself to the social system. A modern society cannot long maintain itself unless there is some approach to justice and proportion in the distribution or the mediation of its spiritual goods and values among all its members.

3. It must be recognized, further, that the industrial type of society is the medium through which the further realization of democracy is to take place. Through the disturbance of social relationships consequent upon the growth of the modern industrial system, there is danger that, for a time at least, society may be perverted into a mere mechanism for the accomplishment of what is in reality a subordinate purpose of the social process, the accumulation of wealth. The question uppermost in the minds of perhaps a majority at the present is that of the distribution not of the spiritual possessions of humanity, but of wealth. Nor is it always a question of the distribution of wealth; rather it is fre-

quently one of its monopolization by those who have neither proper knowledge nor the desire to render any social equivalent.

4. A fundamental problem of present society is therefore that of mediating its fund of interests and values in such a way that all its members may gain a deeper consciousness of the social significance of their work. In other words, How can the industrial organization be more completely socialized and spiritualized? How can correct moral values be restored to men as guiding forces in the aims of life, and the sense of the moral and spiritual unity of mankind be made more and more to prevail? Just here is a point of interaction between the problem of social progress and that of education.

¶ XXIV. THE PROCESS OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION

1. Society an existence in a continual process of becoming — Differentiation and integration — Natural selection — Adaptation to environment — Adaptation to environment and progress.

2. The growth of social experience — Its communication and transmission — Social heredity through which the individual is enabled to profit by the experience of others — Abbreviations of the process of trial and error through the impulse to imitate — Imitation and plasticity — Social order — The equipment of the individual, (*a*) nervous plasticity, and (*b*) consciousness — Consciousness as arising in tension between psychophysical organism and environment — Consciousness as a variation and as selective — Progress on the basis of order (*i. e.*, the individual as plastic and imitative accommodates himself to the social order, but as conscious and therefore selective produces variations which society deems valuable and which it accordingly selects) — Social evolution or progress is always by means of the individual — Society, as it were, represents the habitual. It is through the individual that variations occur, but variation always on the basis of previous accommodations: otherwise the variations would not be recognized as socially available. They would not, accordingly, be socially selected and transmitted. To repeat, society and the individual are terminal aspects of a unitary process, for purposes of examination separable: in reality, inseparable. The conclusion is therefore warranted that social evolution and the evolution of personality are fundamentally the complementary aspects of the

same fact. Personality is the real presupposition and goal of the social process. The function of all institutional life is the creation and development of human personality — Social evolution and the democratic type of society.

3. The significance of the prolongation of infancy — Helplessness of the child and the maternal instinct and affection of the mother — Education arose as the solution of a difficulty — The growth of social tradition and the gradual projection of the tendency to transmit experience into an ideal — Natural and telic education — The emphasis at first upon plasticity, rather than individuality — Education gradually assuming a consciously centralized form — Educational theory as the conscious formulation of the method of spiritual evolution.

4. Education and social progress — The two types of society, the stationary and the progressive — Corresponding types of education — Education as recapitulation of the past, and education as society's method of re-forming or re-making itself — Maintenance of the balance between originality and plasticity in the individual — The 'social person' as representing the educational ideal — No mere social *organ*, but the social *member* — The individual contributes a power, a capacity, an impulse (that through which the movement towards progress takes place); society confers upon the individual a method, a worth, a significance (that through which the existing order is conserved) — Education as the institution by which democratic society will consciously aim to secure the further realization of its own ideal.

Gathering together, then, some results of previous analysis we discover the interrelations of education as a human institution and the problem which the society of the present exhibits. As we move along the history of civilization the three factors are ever before us: (a) the subjugation of nature, (b) the gradual improvement of social institutions, (c) the development of the personal life. Education is organically united with all three: its emphasis, however, is upon the course of personal development.

REFERENCES :

- Addams, *Democracy and Social Ethics*; Alexander, *Moral Order and Progress*; Bosanquet, *Aspects of the Social Problem*; Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*; Butler, *Meaning of Education*; Cunningham, *Western Civilization*; Dewey, *School and Society*; De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*; Donisthorpe, *Individualism*; Eliot,

American Contributions to Civilization; Giddings, *Democracy and Empire*; Godkin, *Problems of Modern Democracy*; Hadley, *The Education of the American Citizen*, also, *Freedom and Responsibility*; Hobson, *The Social Problem*; MacCunn, *The Ethics of Citizenship*; Mackenzie, *Introduction to Social Philosophy*; Mallock, *Aristocracy and Evolution*; McKechnie, *The State and the Individual*; Ritchie, *Natural Rights, Darwin and Hegel*, also, *Studies in Political and Social Ethics*; Shaler, *The Individual*; Stephen (F), *Liberty, Equality and Fraternity*; Stephen (L), *Social Rights and Duties*; Stubbs, *Christ and Democracy*; Vincent, *The Social Mind and Education*.

FURTHER PROBLEMS FOR STUDY:

1. The contention of Sir Henry Maine that 'democracy is the product of a whole series of accidents.'
2. Equality.
3. Individualism.
4. Morality of competition.
5. Social settlements in a democracy.
6. Lecky's contention that 'modern democracy is not favorable to the higher forms of the intellectual life.'
7. The education of public opinion.

VIII. THE COURSE OF PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT

¶ XXV. THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AS PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

1. Science and Philosophy limited by the conditions of human personality — The forms of thought which human personality provides — Consciousness as consciousness of reality — Existence as existence for consciousness — To know the world is to know it in terms of consciousness — Teleological character of science and philosophy — The judgment of fact and the judgment of worth — Science, philosophy, art and religion as descriptions and interpretations of the world-process and its meaning.

2. Clifford's contention that the tendency of the organic process is to personify itself — The category of individuality in the interpretation of the evolutionary process — History and the development of Personality — Personality as a union of universal and individual elements in a single manifestation — The 'Person' as carrying within himself the law (the universal in thought or action) he is bound to obey.

3. Personality, as the actual, concrete self, neither empir-

ical nor transcendental — No self-contained atomic existence — Modes of conscious activity constituents of a single self — Self-knowledge through objective knowledge — Idealism concerned with the relation between objective knowledge and self-knowledge — Development of self-consciousness as a development of consciousness of the process by which the world (of things and their laws, of persons and their thoughts) comes to be known — Knowledge as idealization — Progress through science and philosophy to the insight that the self and the world are embraced as modes in a deeper unity.

4. Aristotle's conception of Being as *Activity* — To be is to act — His notion of potentiality — Actuality as (a) agent or self, and (b) situation (environment) — What the self does is what the self *is* — It expresses itself. What the self really is, is, therefore, what it makes itself to be — Functional interpretation of the activity of the self — The personal realization of a purpose in harmony with the purpose embodied in the larger order — Adaptation and self-development — Self-realization as individual, as social, and as progressive.

5. Philosophy aims to *humanize* the facts of science, that is, to see them in their relation to experience as a whole — The world of intelligence and of humanity as the subject-matter of a philosophy of mind — The process of the mind's liberation and self-realization — Mind as the principle of unification and organization — The entire philosophy of mind, as a *moral*, that is, educational philosophy — The philosophy of mind as wisdom in the art of living — The category of purpose, in reality, applicable not so much as an explanation of the world of nature as in the development of the conscious life of man — Philosophy of mind as philosophy of education — Philosophy of education, attempting to gain a conception of education as a human institution in which its *different aspects grow together and coalesce*, affords the only *concrete* method of education — A philosophy of education as an integration of the sciences and the humanities.

¶ XXVI. THE COURSE OF INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT

I. Education has so far received little more than incidental assistance from psychology, and this, largely, for two reasons: (a) The prevalence of an individualistic method in psychology,

and (b) the comparatively little attention until recent years paid to genetic psychology in the true sense. Education is concerned fundamentally with the process of psychogenesis, the mind's 'becoming'; the process through which the individual, from being a mere sentient organism, 'erects himself above himself.' The psychology which the teacher most needs is that which will enable him to identify a human being — The 'functional' interpretation of psychogenesis.

2. The identification of the individual as the agent in a concrete situation — Activity as experience — The soul's experience as life — Experience as the matter of all knowledge — The task of educational psychology to show how experience (a) grows and (b) is modified.

3. Nature of experience. The mind is not a preëxisting entity which comes to have this or that experience. To begin with such a conception of mind would inevitably force upon us an arbitrary and mechanical view of the experience process. I distinguish, it is true, between the mind and the pen with which I am writing. One is 'subject,' the other, 'object.' But the distinction is a distinction within the process of a unitary experience; the subject and the object are the two halves or terminal aspects of the one experience within consciousness. The unitary experience which I have of this pen *is the reality*. There is no mere mind over against a mere matter; no mere thought over against a mere thing. My experience of the pen is neither a mere physical fact, nor is it a mere psychological fact in the ordinary sense of the term. The self and its object are equally the results of a process. Back of the distinction between the self and the thing there is the experience process. The consciousness of the object and the consciousness of the self issue in their difference from a common source; and the consciousness of the object is an essential element in the consciousness of the self. For reflection only, the two appear as an opposition of elements which are, nevertheless, necessary correlates of each other in experience. As the one aspect of the process takes form and feature, so does the other. Simultaneously with the so-called development of mind, the limits of the 'objective' world recede. The 'development of mind' is thus fundamentally a development within experience by means of the complementary processes of differentiation and integration. Moreover, in this unitary experience

we may distinguish between the content or matter of experience and the mode of experiencing it. Uniting this distinction with the one made above, it will be noted that the self is the bearer of the activity through which the 'experiencing' takes place, while the 'object' is content or material. In terms of educational method, and making use of the Kantian phraseology of 'form' and 'matter,' it may be said that 'experience' is the 'realization' by the self of its matter or content. Educational method is concerned, therefore, not so much with ways or means of importing into the vacant spaces of a pupil's mind materials (studies) supposed to be without, but rather in assisting the pupil to realize in its depth and breadth the meaning of the pupil's own experience.

4. The growth of experience. Experience is essentially dynamic, moving, progressive; the outcome of the entire self-realizing activity of the soul. The essential, the inner nature of experience is revealed in its movement, in its realization, and the movement is the outcome of the self term (or 'terminal aspect,' with its interests, needs, and 'obstinate questionings') of the experience process, and not the outcome of the content (the intellectual or cognitive aspect). The cognitive aspect, whether as sensation or as idea, is simply a sign. That is to say, in the whole round of any experience, the experience-content is but a sign, a mediating link, in the entire experience. Knowledge is thus one phase of experience, one aspect of a unitary happening. But neither in origin nor in aim does it appear to be the ultimate or fundamental aspect. It has no psychical significance apart from the other phases of the experience process. In this process its function is indicative, regulative, mediative. The known 'fact' is known only as part of an experience-process, and as bearer of 'sign' or 'significance' is understood only as part of the entire experience. In the realization of the self, therefore, knowledge is not its own end. True knowledge is not something hard and solid, but a vital element, the significance of which lies in its power to direct or control the onward movement of experience.

5. The social nature of conscious growth. Just as epistemology insists upon the organic relation between intelligence and the world, social psychology insists upon the organic unity of the individual and society. The study of the growth of consciousness, whether in the race or the child, points to the conclusion

that the real self is always a social self; that the nature of the individual is essentially social. In other words, the individual's relations to his fellows are not external attachments of his personality but the source of its inmost content and reality. The completely isolated individual, uninfluenced by social forces, does not exist as a fact of experience. The relative independence we attribute to the individual man is, in reality, the result of later evolution. The child, after the manner also of primitive man, gradually individualizes himself out of a state of social indifference, differentiating his personality in a medium with which he had hitherto identified himself. In normal personal development, however, there is differentiation only that there may be completer integration; there is self-estrangement only that the earlier unity may be more completely understood. In order, then, adequately to recognize the nature of personal consciousness, it must be studied in the light of its social character and growth. The individual soul appears and lives in the sociality of human beings. Sociality is the law (embodied, as has already been noted, in language, in morality, in human institutions) of its existence: it is the specific law of personal experience. The life of the individual is thus an organic, functional unity, in a larger functional whole. The life of the individual is its meaning: and its meaning is born for it in the process of accommodation and response to the wider intellectual and moral order which encompasses it. Personal consciousness is, therefore, the result of a constant give and take, an unceasing social synthesis. The experience of the person is at once individual and social. Social, in the sense that the stimulus is always socially initiated and the response socially determined: individual, in the sense that the experience is a realization of the self.

6. The social control of individual development — The contribution of the individual: instinctive and impulsive tendencies. The contribution of society: plans of action, values, interpretations — Experience in the individual is thus the outcome of these two 'energies,' namely, the qualities, impulsive and instinctive of the individual agent, and the stimuli, regulative and interpretative, of society — The self expresses itself in and through its environment (social) — Influence upon consciousness of the success or failure of the activity — Expression always socially controlled — The methods of social control: (a) Imitation and sug-

gestion, (b) Habituation, (c) Instruction—The significance of these processes in the organization and upbuilding of experience—They all serve to give ‘form’ to individual experience—The meaning of instruction as a method of social control—Studies as social experience systematically organized as *plans of action*, by means of which the individual may master or interpret his own experience.

¶ XXVII. THE IDEAL AS SELF-REALIZATION

1. Self-realization as a working ideal—The self as a concrete, living unity in process of realization—The identity of the self and its realization—The actual and the ideal in living unity—Through self-consciousness the self returns upon itself and, grasping the law of its own development, contrasts the ideal and the actual—The law of its own development also the law of the world objective to itself—Environment as a presentation to the individual of his other, unrealized self—Self-realization as a realization of the nature of the self as a whole, as a statement, is not barren, because the only self we know is a self whose nature is in a process of realization.

2. Aspects of conscious life:

(a) *Intellectual*. The growth of knowledge as a social process—The common intellectual life of man—Knowledge as a spiritual organism—The main forms of intellectual construction involved in the building up of experience: (i) Perceptual; (ii) Scientific; (iii) Ethical; (iv) Aesthetic; (v) Philosophical; (vi) Religious—Degrees of knowledge—The significance of the categories—The objective world as an idea-world—Aim of science: (i) intercommunication with a view to coöperation; (ii) economy of intellectual labor through the discovery of general rules applicable to typical situations in social life—Philosophy as the organic unity of the sciences—The goal of knowledge not the abstract but the concrete—Methods of knowledge in relation to methods in education.

(b) *Aesthetic*. The apprehension of the beautiful—As emotional—The judgment of appreciation—The liberation of the self from itself—The meaning of Bosanquet’s statement: ‘That the world of mind, or the world above sense, exists as an actual and organized whole, is a truth most easily realized in

the study of the beautiful. And to grasp this principle as Hegel applies it is nothing less than to acquire a new contact with spiritual life.'

(c) *Moral*. As actual and as moral the self a member of society — The end of action and the good — The activity and the good as *concrete* — The good as realized in the concrete circumstances of life — Goodness as the transcendence of the *natural* life — Imperfect development through imperfect knowledge — Freedom of the self through moral insight — Moral personality (i) as progressive, (ii) as possessed of sound intellect, (iii) as efficient, (iv) as responsive to the claims of the moral order by which it is surrounded — Self-realization as the organization of life in harmony with the moral insight.

3. Gathering together, then, in brief form, some of the results of the preceding analysis of the course of personal development, we may say:

(a) The realization of the self is attained through an inward movement, by which, while its manifestation becomes manifold, its identity is still preserved.

(b) The progress of the soul's life in its intellectual, aesthetic and moral aspects is from the level of the instinctive and impulsive, a level in which the self is, as it were, immersed in the material, to the level in which the material has become transformed and organized, according to the thought and purpose of the soul.

(c) The realization of the self is possible ultimately because the principles that are constitutive and regulative in the process of the individual life are the constitutive and regulative principles in the objective world of nature and humanity.

(d) The life of the soul, while dependent on an inward energy, is nevertheless a continual process of self-estrangement. Its reality lies in a movement outward, which is at the same time a movement upward. Progress in inner freedom is through liberation to higher forms of being.

4. The incompleteness and inadequacy of experience — Society as an inevitable condition of the realization of the self — The insufficiency of social life — The individual, while in his development consolidated and sustained by the social order, is inevitably impelled beyond any *actual* society — The inner connection between morality and religion — From the philosophical

point of view, religion has two functions, (a) to explain nature, (b) to explain and give coherence to the moral life. If we maintain the supremacy of reason in the interpretation of experience we assert that reason is the fundamental of all life. 'God is forever reason; and His communication, His revelation, is reason; not, however, abstract reason, but reason as taking a body from, and giving life to, the whole system of experience which makes the history of man. The revelation, therefore, is not made in a day, or a generation, or a century. The divine mind touches, modifies, becomes the mind of man, through a process of which mere intellectual conception is only the beginning, but of which the gradual complement is an unexhausted series of spiritual discipline through all the agencies of social life.' (T. H. Green.)

¶ XXVIII. THE PLACE OF EDUCATION IN THE COURSE OF INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT

1. The transmission of the traditional wisdom — Education as a social institution — The system of education as the basis of social order — Education as a form of social control — As a form of social economy — As a means to the social appropriation of individual achievement — As a method of society in mediating or individuating its spiritual possessions.

2. Education necessary to the production of a human being — Education and economy in the individual life — Society as a medium through which the realization of the self takes place — No question of the individual *versus* society — The organic relation of individual 'ends' and social 'ends' — 'Over-specialization' in the industrial and the intellectual life — Science, art, and morality as related aspects of one functional activity — Uniqueness of service and self-sacrifice in society's behalf — Education as preparing for effective participation by the individual in the social order — Culture and the spiritual life — Bosanquet's description of culture as 'the habit of mind instinct with purpose, cognizant of a tendency and connection in human achievement, able and industrious in discerning the great from the trivial' — The work of education and the deepening and enrichment of experience — Inward intensity and outward expansion — The expression of human qualities at their acme — The aim of education as action with full consciousness of its meaning and significance.

¶ XXIX. PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION AS KNOWLEDGE OF THE PRESUPPOSITION OF INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT

In his little treatise *De Emendatione Intellectus* Spinoza says that we must 'have an exact knowledge of the nature which we desire to perfect, and also know as much as possible of nature in general.' The philosophy of education is, for the most part, concerned with the presuppositions of education. It is not concerned with finding out new facts nor supporting new ideals. It is concerned with the organization rather than the enlargement of our knowledge. And yet the best way to find out what man may be is to know what he is. If the preceding analysis be along the line of truth, the education of the individual is seen to have its foundations deep down in the very nature of things. A philosophy of education should give us guidance: it will also give us hope.

REFERENCES:

- (a) Concerning the general conception of 'experience,' consult, Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*; Caird, *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*; Dewey, in *Mind*, (Vol. XI); Hobhouse, *Theory of Knowledge*; James, *Principles of Psychology*, also, *Will to Believe*; Mackenzie, *Outlines of Metaphysics*; Schiller, *Humanism*; Stout, *Analytic Psychology*; Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*.
- (b) Concerning the idea of 'self,' consult, Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*; Dewey, *The Study of Ethics*; Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*; Mackenzie, *Introduction to Social Philosophy*; McTaggart, *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*; Royce, *The World and the Individual*; Stout, *Manual of Psychology*; Wallace, *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, The Logic of Hegel (Prolegomena)*, also, *Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics*.
- (c) Concerning the topic 'genesis' in the mental life, consult, Baldwin, *Mental Development*, I-II, also, *Development and Evolution*; Bosanquet, *Psychology of the Moral Self*; Harris, *Psychologic Foundations of Education*; Hobhouse, *Mind in Evolution*; James, *Principles of Psychology*; Ormond, *Foundations of Knowledge*; Stout, *Manual of Psychology*.
- (d) Concerning the 'social' character of consciousness, consult, Baldwin, *Mental Development*, I-II, also, *Development and Evolution*; Mezes, *Ethics Descriptive and Explanatory*; Royce, *The World and the Individual, Outlines of Psychology*, also, *Studies in Good and Evil*; Stephen, *Science of Ethics*; Stout, *Manual of Psychology*; Tarde, *Laws of Imitation*; Wallace, *Lectures and Essays*.
- (e) Concerning 'self-realization' as the moral ideal, consult, Alex-

ander, *Moral Order and Progress*; Bosanquet, *Philosophical Theory of the State*; Bradley, *Ethical Studies*; Dewey, *Outlines of Ethics*; Duff, *Spinoza's Political and Ethical Philosophy*; Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*; Laurie, *Ethica*; Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics*; Moore, *Principia Ethica*; Muirhead, *The Elements of Ethics*; Paulsen, *A System of Ethics*; Sorley, *Ethics of Naturalism*; Taylor, *The Problem of Conduct*.

FURTHER PROBLEMS FOR STUDY:

1. The concept of mental activity.
2. The bearings of Pragmatism on educational theory.
3. The nature of experience.
4. Mind as product and as principle.
5. The psychology of the 'ethical' self.
6. Society as a psychological organization.
7. The rational sanction of social service.
8. Correspondence of the processes of individual and social development.

IX. THE SCHOOL AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION

¶XXX. THE CONTINUITY OF THE EDUCATIONAL PROCESS

The educative process is essentially continuous. The idea fundamental to the process is the realization of the individual through his increasing participation in the knowledge, the interests and the activities of social life. From the individual's earliest infancy this process of participation has been widening and deepening, and always to some degree under the direction and control of the expectations and demands of those who form the social enclosure of his life. Family life, no matter how unorganized it may at first sight appear, saturates the child's mind, directs his activity and thus introduces some degree of order into his unregulated impulses. In the school is found a more highly organized factor in the process of mediating the fund of social interests and values and thus securing the social transformation of the individual. Yet while the school as a moral institution may perform its task more consciously or more systematically than the family or the other educative institutions, it cannot do so more inevitably or with more permanent or far-reaching effect. As was indicated in Section VI the entire environment of the individual as concentrated in the great human institutions, the home,

the school, the vocation, the state, and the church, is to be regarded fundamentally as a medium in which the educational process, as a unitary and continuous thing, is organized and directed. The school, therefore, is that form of institutional life in which are concentrated those agencies and influences through which society endeavors to reinforce the life of those who are to be its members with such forms of experience as make for effective membership in a social order.

¶ XXXI. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE SCHOOL

1. The social function of education among primitive peoples — Early education through the family and community life — The principle of specialization of function and division of labor among institutions — Clearly operative in the history of education — The development of the philosophical schools in Greece — Social character of Greek education — Practical character of Roman education — The religious motive in Judea — Education in the school as a phase of the work of the church — Gradual development of the notion of education as a function of the state — The ensuing intellectualization of education — The growth of the idea of preparation for citizenship — Tendency to isolate the state and society — The complex, and yet organic unity of life in society — The complexity of the social aim — Social extension of the public school.

2. Lack of continuity in the organization of the school at the present time — A mosaic, the parts of which are the result of various historic conditions and motives — The struggle with 'fixed' social conditions — Tensions in the educational and the social process — The origin of the Kindergarten in an ethical motive — The Elementary school in its origin utilitarian — Renaissance origin of the Academy and the High School — Dualism between elementary and secondary education — Conflicting aims — The American College and University — The dualism between 'liberal' and 'professional' education — Professor Dewey's analysis of the 'educational situation.'

¶ XXXII. THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SCHOOL

1. The school as a moral organism — As an embodiment of the social purpose — Ways in which the school aims to realize the social purpose — A medium of assimilation — The extension of the individual's consciousness of kind — Not mere preparation for living, but a life with interest and meaning in the present — Selection and idealization in the school through curriculum, method, discipline — The balance between the ideal and the real — Cultivation of the social dispositions and habits — Diversity of individuals in a community of relations — It is, after all, through association that individuals are enabled to become distinguishable from one another. It is essential, therefore, that in the school a balance be maintained between what may be called the individualization and the assimilation of the individual units to the social process. In a truly dynamic society the consciousness of difference keeps pace with the consciousness of kind.

2. Advantages and dangers in school education — A legitimate form of self-preservation on the part of the state — Provision against the imperfection or contingency of private effort — The 'institutionally' educated man, versus the 'self-educated' man — A social medium for the development of leadership and self-reliance — Social judgment and public opinion — Lack of flexibility in a changing social life — The 'lock-step movement' — Waste in school-life — Dr. Harris's statement of the educational function of the isolation of the school.

3. The social possibilities of the school — The social order — The recitation as a social process — Individual responsibility — The ethics of democracy and the ethics of the school — The several types of education — The respective functions of the several types of school in mediating the spiritual inheritance of society to its members and assimilating them to the social purpose.

4. The teacher as organizer of the community life of the school — The mediating function of the teacher in the social process — Interdependence of theory and practice — The teacher's realization of the *meaning* of the social process — Action in its highest sense is *doing* with adequate *realization of the meaning* of what we are doing.

REFERENCES:

In addition to the works in Sociology and Ethics referred to in previous sections, the following may be consulted: Barnett, *Common Sense in Education*; Bryant, *Educational Ends*; Dewey, *School and Society*, also, *The Educational Situation*; Dutton, *Social Phases of Education*; Henderson, *Education and the Larger Life*; Hyde, *Practical Idealism*; Mark, *Individuality and the Moral Aim in Education*; Parker, *Concentration*; Rooper, *Studies and Addresses*; Search, *An Ideal School*; Skrine, *Pastor Agnorum*; Thring, *Education and School*; Tompkins, *School Management*; Young, *Isolation in the School*, also, *Ethics in the School*.

FURTHER PROBLEMS FOR STUDY:

1. Individuality as an end in education.
2. The function of education in democratic society.
3. Isolation in the school.
4. The school as a selective agency in social life.
5. The private school in democratic society.
6. The public school as a social center.
7. The school as an instrument of social progress.

X. THE INTELLECTUAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SCHOOL

¶ XXXIII. THE PROBLEM OF THE COURSE OF STUDY

In coming to the question of the intellectual organization of the school we meet at once the problems of subject-matter and method. What determines these two elements of the process within the school, and what are their mutual relations? A majority, perhaps, would agree that method should be given a psychological basis. This question is considered a little more fully later in the section. So far as the subject-matter is concerned common procedure seems much more empirical. The need of *re-forming* the course of study in harmony with a new order of society has been felt but not as yet distinctly realized.

Looking back over the history of educational theories since the Renaissance, we find at least three well-defined types of doctrine concerning the aim and standard in the selection of studies: (a) The Humanistic, (b) The Realistic, (c) The Disciplinarian. Other motives, also, entered, serving to complicate the problem: (a) the ethical, as part of the modern democratic movement, (b) the utilitarian, (c) the political. The last two have been connected primarily with the work of the elementary school con-

ceived as a preparation for practical life and the duties of citizenship.

In recent years three typical attempts have been made to gain some kind of working philosophy or basis of the course of study, other than that of mere tradition or empiricism, — the theories of Dr. Harris, Professor Rein and Professor Dewey.

¶ XXXIV. THE COURSE OF STUDY AS INTERPRETED BY DR. HARRIS

Consult, *Psychologic Foundations of Education*.

According to Dr. Harris, "Any complete course of study has five coördinate groups. Two phases of nature, three phases of man, five phases in all are presented by human learning and are presented also by the normal course of study in the school."

1. In the light of the interpretation of the course of study given in the *Psychologic Foundations* it will be noted that for Dr. Harris:

(a) The point of emphasis in the theory is the spiritual dependence of the individual on the civilization into which he is born.

(b) The school, in attempting to preserve the integrity of civilization, should aim primarily not to secure the individual variation, but rather to produce the type of life that is generic, historic and characteristically human.

(c) The controlling principle, therefore, in the selection and correlation of studies is that of their place and function in maintaining the historic unity and continuity of human experience.

2. Taking the theory as a whole in its relation to Dr. Harris's general philosophical position the following questions might, perhaps, be raised:

(a) Is the somewhat dualistic conception of man's environment consistent with the general monistic theory fundamental to Dr. Harris's teaching, and, if it is not consistent, does it furnish us a philosophical and unitary principle by which to determine the course of study?

(b) Is not the analysis into groups of studies logical rather than psychological? Is not the coördination regarded from the educator's rather than from the child's point of view? The psychology of a study implies the interpretation of the *experience*

for which the study stands from the genetic point of view, *i. e.*, from the point of view of the one who is realizing the experience: whereas the logic of a study is concerned with the classification of 'experiences' from the standpoint of completed product, rather than from that of imperfect or incomplete process. A logic (or psychology) of the course of study, aiming at a classification of experiences, assumes differentiation. A psychology of studies is concerned as well with the other phase of the problem of upbuilding experience through instruction, namely, the phase of the process by which out of the 'continuum' of the child's experiences, differences gradually emerge. The problem seems to be, fundamentally, one of reaching an interpretation of instruction as a dynamic process.

(c) For Dr. Harris the fundamental principle of philosophy and psychology is self-activity. The goal of evolution is the realization of the self in nature and the knowledge of self. But this evolution in the 'mastery of knowledge and control takes place in the individual through his self-activity, through his ability to modify his environment.' Does not the language of the chapter on the 'Course of Study' tend to suggest a conception of the soul as a passive monad rather than a self-active one? According to Dr. Harris's interpretation of the category of self-activity, studies should ultimately be regarded as modes of self-realization rather than as external materials or objective existences 'mirrored' by the mind. 'Take away,' says Dr. Harris, 'the individual's power of self-determination and surround him ever so much with the adaptations of nature or with summarized results of human observation and reflection and it all goes for nothing.' Are not these words applicable, to some degree at least, to the child? If they are, it would seem to follow logically that we should not underestimate the value of direct, personal, productive experience, of a close union of intelligence and will through the entire school life, of some personal intimacy with typical processes whereby the society of the present is actually maintained.

¶ XXXV. PROFESSOR REIN'S FORMULATION OF THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF INSTRUCTION

Consult, *Outlines of Pedagogics*.

Professor Rein maintains that in the formation of the curriculum the following factors should be kept in mind :

- (a) The ultimate moral and religious purpose ;
- (b) The harmonious psychological and historical gradation of the instruction ;
- (c) The correlation of the various materials of instruction.

1. This formulation of the course of study has its basis in the so-called doctrine of the *culture-epochs*, — the doctrine which (to state it in brief form) holds that the individual in his development reproduces the main stages passed through in the evolution of the race ; in other words, that *development* reproduces *evolution* ; the educational inference being that the culture products in particular epochs in the evolution of the race are the most appropriate material for the individual in his corresponding stages of development.

2. Concerning the theory of the 'culture-epochs' as affording the basic principle in the determination of the course of study, the following general considerations are to be kept in view :

(a) There are, in reality, involved two questions, (i) of scientific fact, (ii) of educational interpretation. So far it is an hypothesis merely, and not a statement of scientific fact. While lacking strict scientific verification, there is this to be said in its support, that as a doctrine it has been a common possession of man in many lines of intellectual activity. This, however, does not eliminate its hypothetical character.

(b) Admitting its provisional character as a scientific theory, it will at once be recognized how this idea of correspondence between race evolution and individual development would tend to emphasize the essentially organic and social character of consciousness, and that the development of the individual must be along the lines marked out by the previous evolutionary process. In other words, that the progress of the future must be essentially in the directions and by the method indicated in the spiritual achievements of the past.

(c) The 'culture-epoch' theory, as outlined by Professor Rein, seems at first to favor a genetic or psychological statement of the course of study, rather than a merely logical or sociological one. On the other hand, the question may with fairness be asked, If an exact parallelism cannot be proved, which standard are we to employ, the apperceiving levels (processes) in the development of the individual, or the successive epochs (culture-products) in the evolution of the race?

(d) Even though it be granted that similar 'psychical attitudes' exist in primitive man and the child (a very large admission, in the light of the different environments, environments which are, in reality, not "outside" the instincts but organically united with them), is it not true that the child persists in that 'attitude' a very much shorter time than did primitive man? The fact of social heredity makes mental economy possible. Has not the progress of civilization, from one point of view, meant this very thing, the regulating, the abbreviating and facilitating the process of adaptation to the existing social order? Taken in its literalness, the culture-epoch theory would produce an effect directly the contrary to that proposed by education. The accommodation or adjustment, in which the 'idea' of the educational process is discerned, is not with reference to stages of civilization which have been left behind or outgrown, but to that concrete and actual social system of interests, values, activities, which together constitute the reality of present civilization. It is present civilization as actual and as embodying an ideal towards which the society of the present is struggling which the child is to be led to understand. Recourse is had to the past not for its own sake, nor because it is "dead," but in order that through contrast a more comprehensive understanding of the present which has grown out of the past may be secured. The past must throw light upon the present; it must not become a substitute for it.

¶ XXXVI. PROFESSOR DEWEY'S INTERPRETATION OF THE COURSE OF STUDY

Consult, *School and Society*; *The Educational Situation*; *The Elementary School Record*; *Ethical Principles Underlying Education*, in, *Third Year Book of the Herbart Society*.

Professor Dewey maintains that the education of the present must undergo, in response to the changed social conditions, a reconstruction in aim, in subject-matter and method; a reconstruction not hurried nor haphazard, but thorough-going and rational. This reconstruction, moreover, Professor Dewey holds, is already in progress. For him the controlling factors in the primary curriculum of the future are 'manual training, science, nature-study, art and history. These keep alive the child's positive and creative impulses, and direct them in such ways as to discipline them into the habits of thought and action required for effective participation in community life.' 'It is possible to initiate the child from the first in a direct, not abstract or symbolic, way, into the operations by which society maintains its existence, material and spiritual.' 'The present has its claims. It is in education, if anywhere, that the claims of the present should be controlling . . .' 'Nevertheless eternal vigilance is the price of liberty, and eternal care and nurture are the price of maintaining the precious conquest of the past — of preventing a relapse into Philistinism, that combination of superficial enlightenment and dogmatic crudity. If it were not for an aristocracy of the past, there would be but little worth conferring upon the democracy of to-day.'

¶ XXXVII. THE MEANING OF THE COURSE OF STUDY

I. Education as a method by means of which individuals come to participate in an intellectual and moral inheritance — The spiritual possessions of society as the outcome of experience — The spiritual organism of experience — The course of study as representing that organism — Its unity — Its reproduction by the individual — The process of familiarization — The penetration and realization by the individual of the intellectual order of the school — The aim of instruction as the mediating

between this intellectual order and the mind of the pupil in such a way that the latter may conform to its law, not as a matter of constraint but as the natural expression of his own mind — The school as developing an attachment to an intellectual and moral order of life.

2. The meaning of 'studies' in terms of social life — The curriculum as representing the corporate (the unitary and inter-related) aspect, and studies as representing the individual (differentiated) aspects of social experience — The difficulty inherent in any rigid classification — Social life as furnishing the standard of educational values — The movement of social experience maintained through knowledge (science) and expression (art) — Science, art and morality as phases of the unitary, spiritual movement of social life — The curriculum as affording (a) a method, (b) an interpretation or value, by which the individual learns the meaning of his capacities in their functional relation to the social order. Studies as plans of action by means of which the individual gains control over and help in the interpretation of his experience — Control over experience (through gaining its method and interpretation) as growth in freedom.

3. Principles to be kept in mind in the selection of studies: (a) Sociological. Does the study (as a group of facts or principles gathered together and systematized) embody some fundamental phase of social experience? Does it represent a fundamental manifestation of the spiritual life of the race? What interest is fundamental to the study? (b) Psychological. What part does the study play in helping the individual to interpret his crude experience and to control his powers with reference to social ends?

4. Conceived in relation to the individual learner, studies represent phases in the movement or process of a unitary experience. This experience is continuous: it is also dynamic, transitional. Studies, then, must first of all appeal to the individual as continuous with his own experience. As *educational* material studies have existence only in the experience of some individual. The individual, as bearer of the experience, and as the agent through whom the movement of experience takes place, is the ultimate center of the differentiation and integration in which mental development consists. The self at any stage is an organic whole, and analysis and synthesis (differentiation and integration) are

correlative elements in the movement of a unitary experience. The constitutive and defining element in a study is the particular impulse or interest it represents in the unity of experience. Studies represent fundamentally attempts towards a construction by the individual of the world of experience from particular points of view. They arise through the emergence in new situations of interests, attitudes, and tensions within the process of self-maintenance and self-development. From this point of view, therefore, it is not entirely true that studies 'succeed' one another: the educative process is rather a continuous *re-formation* or *re-construction* of experience in the light of new interests and deepening appreciation of its significance.

5. The doctrine of the social nature of consciousness has been perhaps sufficiently emphasized in previous sections. Here it is necessary, therefore, merely to indicate some of its more important implications in the theory of the course of study. These may be summarized as follows: (a) The necessity of continuity between the informal education of the home and the more formal education of the school. (b) The experience of the child with its interests, activities, habits, forms the true center of correlation in the educational process, viewed from the psychological side. From the social point of view the principle is found in the typical social activities and interests. (c) (As a corollary of the preceding) Studies will have vital significance for the individual in the degree to which they can be related to the process of social life, and thus made, in turn, organic parts of the individual's needs, interests, purposes. (d) If social experience is unitary, it follows that there is but one subject-matter, now emphasized from one point of view, and now from another, in accordance with the level of experience and ability attained by the pupils. (e) Good character as the end of the intellectual and moral order of the school will be developed, not so much through special instruction, as through the entire society of the school, the community, the recitation, the method, the discipline and the general moral atmosphere.

6. The question of the relation of subject-matter and method is ultimately akin to the problem of knowledge in general. When Kant asks, 'By what means our faculty of knowledge should be aroused to activity but by objects?' his question (as the whole tenor of his later argument discloses) amounts to this, 'How a

non-existent object should act upon a non-existent subject.' So far at least as the *Aesthetic* is concerned, Kant appears to take for granted that the subject has a nature of its own independently of the object, and the object a nature of its own independently of the subject. In a manner very similar much of the discussion at the present time seems to assume a dualism of subject-matter and method. As was indicated in Sub-section 13, the result of the Kantian analysis was that the 'object' is relative to the 'subject.' In like manner it is to be remembered that the subject-matter is relative to the nature of the individual. It is not something hard and fixed, external to the mind. The educational process is not the outcome of a mind with pre-formed faculties operating upon external material; nor is it the adaptation of a mind to a material completely pre-determined. It is a process in which the organization of the material goes hand in hand with the organization or realization of a self or person. Subject-matter and method, therefore, are not completely isolable entities, but are rather the terminal or differentiated aspects of the process of upbuilding a unitary experience. A subject is a mental process and its method is the mode of operation of the mental process.

¶ XXXVIII. THE METHOD OF EDUCATION IN THE EVOLUTION OF CIVILIZATION

The method of self-knowledge — Evolution maintains that we cannot understand a human being except by knowing the process whereby he has come to be what he is — The individual to be educated is intelligible only as part of a process — To know himself, to consciously possess himself, the individual must know his presuppositions in nature and civilization — Culture as the realization in consciousness of the presuppositions of personal life — The 'course of study' in the school and college as a chart of civilization — Philosophy as a synthesis — The evolution of civilization as the basis of a system of national education.

FURTHER PROBLEMS FOR STUDY:

1. Adjustment of education to contemporary needs.
2. Is a permanently adequate definition of education possible?
3. Psychological *versus* logical aspects of the course of study.
4. Philosophy and the integration of studies in the curriculum.



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